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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J O H N M. RAPP, dba R A P P
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,
vs.
\ Case No.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation; and MARRIOTT
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

13552

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This was an action by an unsuccessful bidder to recover costs of preparing its bid.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
The court dismissed the action on motions without
an evidentiary hearing.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal and remand for
trial.

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
This case involves the bidding procedures followed
by Salt Lake City in connection with a project for the
construction and leasing of an "in-flight kitchen" at Salt
Lake International Airport. The facts are as set out in
the pleadings and affidavits.
On or about November 30, 1972, the city entered
into a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Airline
Foods, Inc., which is a subsidiary of defendant Marriott
Corporation.
Under the agreement Airline Foods leased from
Salt Lake City real property at the Salt Lake International airport and was to operate the in-flight catering
kitchen. The property involved was then vacant, but
under the terms of the agreement Salt Lake City was to
construct "at its expense" the necessary buildings for the
kitchen, in accordance with plans and specifications prepared by Airline Foods. But the city's expense was limited by the following provision:
"Lessor shall pay for the 'cost of the project.'
Provided that in the event the 'cost of the project'
shall exceed the total sum of Five Hundred Fifty
Thousand ($550,000) Dollars, the lessee shail
promptly pay lessor upon demand the amount by
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which the 'cost of the project' exceeds such sum
and which is the result of change orders and other
amendments and supplements to the construction
contract or contracts issued or executed by lessor
at the written request of and approved by lessee.
On or about May 1, 1973, Salt Lake City sent to
various construction contractors invitations for bids on
the project. I n response to the invitation for bid Rapp
Construction Company submitted a bid for $648,888.00,
compared with a preliminary estimate of $650,000.00 by
Salt Lake City.
The obligations of Airline Foods under the lease
and concession agreements had been guaranteed by defendant Marriott Corporation, and the concession and
lease agreement contained an express provision that defendant Marriott Corporation would be permitted to bid
on all or any portion of the construction work. Although
Marriott Corporation did not bid directly on the construction project it submitted a bid through J.J.G. Construction Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, in the
amount of $540,000.00. Over the protest of Rapp, the
second lowest bidder, the contract was awarded to J.J.G.
Construction Company.
There was nothing in the bidding documents sent
out by Salt Lake City to give contractors notice of the
agreement between Salt Lake City and Marriott Corporation and, for all the contractors knew, they were
bidding on an equal basis with all other contractors who
were being asked to submit bids.
3
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I t has been the consistent practice of the Salt Lake
City Engineer's Office to publish a request for bids on
all public improvement projects estimated to cost
$12,000.00 or more, regardless of whether the funds
were general city funds or special city funds.
A comparison of the Salt Lake City's estimated cost
of the project, the bid of J.J.G. Construction, and the
other bids, suggests that the invitation for bids in this
case was not an attempt to obtain competitive prices in
the public interest, but was for the purpose of assisting
Airline Foods in limiting its liability under the provision
of the contract which required Salt Lake City to pay the
cost of the project only up to $550,000.00. The amount
of J.J.G.'s bid being just $10,000.00 below the liability
limit and $110,000.00 below the estimate, the invitation
for bids must have been issued for the purpose of giving
an appearance that the competitive bidding was in the
interest of Salt Lake City.
Particular corporate entities being disregarded, the
lessee and lessor entered into a construction contract for
a project the plans and specifications for which were
prepared by the lessee. Change orders had to be approved by the city and the lessee.
There was no way in which other bidders could
compete on an equal basis with J . J . G . Construction
Company, but they were given no intimation of their
competitive disadvantage. Because of the appearance of
legitimacy, the other bidders went to great expense in
preparing and submitting bids on the project. I t is his
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

expense in the preparation of a bid that the plaintiff
seeks to recover in this action.
The court however summarily dismissed the action
without hearing evidence.
I
I N A D V E R T I S I N G F O R BIDS A MUNICIPALITY WARRANTS THAT BIDS ARE
S O U G H T I N GOOD F A I T H A N D F O R P U B LIC PURPOSES.
This case is one of first impression in Utah, but is a
first cousin of cases holding that public bodies may be
held liable for expenses if the bidding procedure is
tainted.
The doctrine that advertising for bids obligates the
advertising party to fairly consider all bids is enunciated
in the landmark case of Heyer Products Co. v. United
States, 140 F.Supp. 409, 135 Ct.Cl. 63 (1956) and has
been faithfully adhered to by the U.S. Court of Claims
ever since.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has adopted the principle that a prima facie showing of arbitrary or capricious consideration of bids by an
agency will entitle an unsuccessful bidder to a hearing.
Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App.D.C.
371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970) ; Wheelabrator Corp. v. Clafee, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971) ; M.
Steinthal § Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 221,
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

455 F.2d 1289 (1971); Blackhawk Heating <§ Plumbing
Co. v. Driver, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 433 F.2d 1137
(1970); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 140 U.S.App.
D.C. 98, 28 L.Ed.2d 234, 433 F.2d 1204 (1970), cert,
denied, 401 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1186 (1971) ; Simpson
Electric Co. v. Seamans, 317 F . Supp. 684 (D.D.C.
1970); Keco Industries v. Laird, 318 F.Supp. 1361
(D.D.C. 1970). The Scanwell court noted that even in
the absence of a statute providing for it, a showing of
arbitrariness will entitle plaintiff to a hearing.
The Court of Claims has incorporated the language
of Scanwell in its criteria for determining fairness in
considering bids. Keco Industries v. United States, 428
F.2d 1233, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 (1970). A bidder who establishes that the government has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in awarding a bid to another is entitled to recover costs incurred in preparing his bid.
The Heyer case involved a situation where the contract was awarded to a contractor whose bid was higher
than those of six other bidders. The plaintiff alleged that
he was the lowest responsible bidder, and that the Ordnance Tank Automotive Center acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in warding a contract to supply circuit testers to another. The plaintiff alleged that the following
statute was violated:
"All bids shall be publicly opened at the time
and place stated in the advertisement. Award
shall be made with reasonable promptness by
written notice to that responsible bidder whose
bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be
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most advantageous to the Government, price and
other factors considered: Provided, that all bids
may be rejected when the agency head determines that it is in the public interest so to do." 41
U.S.C.A. §152. [Emphasis added]
The court went on to point out that the public only
rather than an unsuccessful bidder had standing to contest the award of the contract. But this does not leave
the wronged bidder without a remedy.
The Court said:
"The advertisement for bids was, of course, a
request for offers to supply the things the Ordnance Department wanted. It could accept or reject an offer as it pleased and no contract resulted
until an offer was accepted. Hence, an unsuccessful bidder cannot recover the profit he would
have made out of the contract, because he had no
contract.
"But this is not to say that he may not recover
the expense to which he was put in preparing his
bid.
"It was an implied condition of the request for
offers that each of them would be honestly conmdered and that that offer which in the honest
opinion of the contracting officer was most advantageous to the Government would be accepted. No person would have bid at all if he had
known that ethe cards were stacked against him'
No bidder would have put out $7,000 in preparing its bid as plaintiff says it did, if it had known
the Ordnance Department had already determined to give the contract to the Weidenhoff
Company. I t would not have put in a bid unless
it thought it was to be honestly considered. I t had

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a right to think it would be. The Ordnance Department impliedly promised plaintiff it would
be. This is what induced it to spend its money to
prepare its bid.
"The OTAC knew it would involve considerable expense to prepare models, photographs,
diagrams and specifications and other things necessary to comply with the invitation, and so, when
it invited plaintiff to incur this expense, it must
necessarily be implied that it promised to give
fair and impartial consideration to its bid, having
in mind only the interest of the Government and
not the interest of some favorite bidder.
"That promise was broken, shamefully broken, if plaintiff's petition states the facts. If the
facts there stated are true, the conclusion seems
inescapable that the Ordnance Department knew
from the beginning they were going to give Weidenoff the contract. The advertisement for bids
was a sham, done only to appear to comply with
the law, to clothe their apparently dishonest purpose with the habiliments of legality. If these
allegations are true, they practiced a fraud on
plaintiff and on all other innocent bidders. They
induced them to spend their money to prepare
their bids on the false representation that their
bids would be honestly considered.
"This implied contract has been broken, and
plaintiff may maintain an action for damages for
its breach." [Emphasis added]
Although there was no contract for materials until
the bid was accepted, there was a collateral implied contract that all bids would be given fair consideration.
I n Keco Industries v. United States, 428 F.2d
1233, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 (1970), an unsuccessful bidder
8
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brought an action against the government. The court
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that a bidder who can make a prima facie showing of
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Government has standing to sue, and may recover the costs
of preparing his bid upon proof of such action.
Referring to the Heyer case, the court found that
its holding was not intended to be limited to situations
involving intentional fraud. The court said:
"Instead we find that Heyer stated a broad general rule which is that every bidder has the right
to have his bid honestly considered by the government, and if this obligation is breached, then
the injured party has the right to come into court
to try and prove his cause of action." 428 F.2d
1233, 1237.
The court in Armstrong <| Armstrong, Inc. v.
United States, 356 F.Supp. 514 (D.C.E.D. Wash.
1973) adopted the Court of Claims rule:
"In actions for damages allegedly incurred because of arbitrary or capricious or otherwise unlawful acts or omissions by administrative agency
procurement officials the Court of Claims has
evolved a rule that applies to all procurement situations. This is, each request for offers to contract with the federal government have as an implied condition that each offer received will be
fairly and honestly considered. When a prima
facie case of arbitrariness or capriciousness has
been established, a claimant will be allowed to
present nonfrivolous claims."
In Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct.Cl. 1971), the court denied
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a motion for summary judgment, finding that there was
a sufficient factual dispute to raise an inference of arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Government.
After recognizing the heavy burden of proof which
the plaintiff must meet, the court said:
"Our decision in Keco was premised at least in
part on the feeling that aggrieved bidders have
the right to require the Government to enforce
the statutes and regulations fairly and honestly,
either by seeking equitable relief in the Federal
district courts or by suing for money damages
here.
"In requesting that we reconsider our holding
in Keco, defendant asserts that permitting suits
such as the present one could create serious problems in maintaining a smooth and effective procurement system. W e have not been told what
these problems will be, but we doubt that our
holding today will jeopardize the procurement
process. Certainly, a suit for damages in this
court after the completion of the contract will not
disrupt the procurement process as much as an
injunction issued before the contract is awarded.
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra. Moreover,
the standard of proof which we require in cases
such as this will undoubtedly discourage frivolous
lawsuits and we do not think that contracting officers will feel intimidated or harassed by a ruling which requires their agencies to pay damages
to a contractor when it is established that he has
sustained a loss as a result of arbitrary and capricious action by the procurement officials."
10
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The statute referred to in Heyer, provided that all
bids might be rejected, hence the solicitation of bids was
not a promise to accept the lowest or best bid.
But we are talking about two different contracts.
The promise to give fair consideration—the promise that
competitive bids are indeed being sought—is not affected by such a statute; and the promise is supported by
consideration: the bidder's time, effort, and expense in
preparing the bid.
Referring to the statutory right to reject any or all
bids, 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1966
Rev.) §29.77 states:
"In exercising the power to reject any or all
bids, and preceeding anew with the awarding of
the contract, the officers cannot act arbitrarily or
capriciously but must observe good faith and accord to all bidders just consideration, thus avoiding favortism, abuse of discretion, or corruption.
Even where the right to reject any and all bids is
properly reserved, the bidding law may not be
evaded under the color of a rejection. Although
the courts generally will not disturb an honest
exercise of discretion, it has been said that they
will intervene to prevent the arbitrary rejection
of a bid when its effect is to defeat the object to
be attained by competition." [Emphasis added]
The Heyer case recognizes that the implied contract
to give fair consideration to all bids does not rest upon
the statutory obligation to award a contract to the bidder
whose bid is most advantageous to the government. The
gravamen of the court's opinion is that it is the act of advertising for bids which creates the obligation to give fair
11
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and impartial consideration, rather than the statutory
duty to award the contract to the best bidder.
II
A CITY MAY BE BOUND BY AN I M P L I E D
CONTRACT.
In the court below, Salt Lake City contended that
there can be no implied contract with it without compliance with statutory formalities, relying upon §24-1-15
Revised Ordiances of Salt Lake City, which in pertinent
part reads as follows:
". . . that no liability against Salt Lake City in
excess of one hundred fifty dollars shall be created by the commissioner of any statutory department without the sanction of the board of commissioners first had and approved . . . except as
herein provided, no person shall create any liability against the City."
But in this case, presumably, the advertising for
bids was approved by the board; and it is that act that
gives rise to the implied contract.
In 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §975, it is
said:
''Notwithstanding some broad judicial statements that a municipal corporation cannot be
made liable as can private individuals, in relations quasi ex contractu, and the principles of law
regarding an implied contract arising from the
rendition of services or quantum meruit are without application in dealing with municipalities, it
is generally considered that a municipal corpora12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion may become liable on an implied contract
within the scope of its corporate powers, where
the contract is deduced by inference from corporate acts, without note, deed, or writing, or is a
quasi contract or contract implied in law.
*

#

#

"Recovery on an implied contract has been
allowed in cases of informal renewals of intra
vires contracts, and in cases of intra vires contracts which are invalidated by the illegality of
the consideration therefor, or by defects or irregularities in the making or execution of the contract, such as failure to comply with constitutional, charter, or statutory requirements."
#

#

*

"It is not always necessary to recovery that
benefits shall have been received; recovery in the
case of a contract set aside for irregularity may
be had for reasonable cost and expense incurred
in the prosecution of the contract before it became
the subject of attack irrespective of any benefit
derived therefrom"
In 10 McQuillan, Municipal Corporation (1966
Rev.) §29.112, it is stated:
"There is considerable authority however, to
support the rule that a recovery may be allowed
in such cases [where statutes prescribing the
method of binding a municipality by contract
have not been complied with] upon the theory
that it is not justice, where a contract is entered
into between a municipality and another, in good
faith, and the corporation has received benefits
thereunder, to permit the municipality to retain
the benefits without paying the reasonable value

13
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therefor, the same as a private corporation or individual would have to do. * * *"
That a municipality in the State of Utah may be
bound by an implied contract is established in Salt Lake
City v. State, 22 U.2d 37, 448 P.2d 350 (1968), in which
the court found that the conduct of the parties evidenced
a contract between Salt Lake City and the Territory
for the City to provide free water to the territory
in consideration of its locating the State Capitol in Salt
Lake City.
There apparently was no integrated agreement to
provide water, but the court implied such an agreement
from the conduct of the parties:
"The actual agreements reached by and between
the two bodies politic must be determined from a
consideration of all of the documents available
together with the understanding of the parties as
was manifested by what was done in connection
therewith." 448 P.2d 350, 355.
The implied contract was enforced in spite of §1774,
Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, vol. I, which provided
that the city recorder:
". . . shall countersign all contracts made in behalf of the city, and every contract made in behalf
of the city or to which the city is a party shall be
void unless signed by the recorder."
CONCLUSION
The right of unsuccessful bidders to maintain an
action to recover the costs of preparing their bids in
14
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instances where there is a showing of arbitrariness and
capriciousness in the advertising for, and in the consideration of bids, has been recently recognized and
is gaining support.
In a time when integrity in government is coming
under severe scrutiny it is encumbent upon the judiciary
to guard against governmental, as well as private lawlessness. If the lower court's decision is left to stand,
the effect will be that any governmental agency may,
at time, enter into secret agreements with favorite
bidders, thereby determining in advance the outcome
of what appears to be competitive bidding, but is in fact,
mere artifice and pretense.
The case of Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake
City Corporation, 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d 769 (1968),
perhaps best sums up the dangers which exist when competitive bidding is made a sham as in the case at bar.
"The purpose of the system of competitive
bidding tends to invite competition, to guard
against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance,
fraud and corruption in the awarding of municipal contracts, and to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practicable, and such a
system is designed for the benefit of the citizens
and taxpayers and the public interest generally/'
The public interest, referred to in Thatcher, can
best be vindicated in cases such as the one at bar by
holding, as in Curtiss-W right Corporation v. McLucas,
364 F.Supp. 750 (D.C.N.J. 1973), that plaintiff shall
have standing to advance the public interest as a private
attorney general,
15
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I t is admitted in the pleadings that the Marriott
subsidiary, Airline Foods Incorporated, was obligated
by a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Salt
Lake City to absorb the cost of the in-flight kitchen in
any sum by which it exceeded $550,000. If plaintiff's
contentions are true that the City estimated the project's
cost at $650,000 and the Marriott subsidiary, J . J . G .
Construction Company, submitted a bid of $540,000.00,
the implication is almost irresistible that Marriott's bid
was based solely upon its contractual liability in the lease
and concession agreement rather than upon any estimated cost.
And if, as the plaintiff contends, Salt Lake City
failed to disclose the fact of the above agreement to
prospective bidders, thereby giving warning of Marriott's competitive advantage, the inference that the
outcome of the bidding was all but predetermined is
likewise irresistible.
These are facts which the plaintiff seeks to litigate
in the trial court. Upon the basis of the authority herein
set forth, he should be afforded that opportunity.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E . Roe
Roe and Fowler
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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